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Divergence of opinion and Long-run Performance of
Private Placements: Evidence from the Auction
market
Abstract
In this paper, we propose and construct a direct measure of investors' divergence of opinion
based on auction bids data of the private placements in China. We nd that the rms with
higher bids dispersion generate lower long-run stock returns after the issuance of private
placements. This eect is economically signicant and robust when controlling for market
discount, earnings management, analysts forecast dispersion, and self-selection bias. More-
over, this negative relation is stronger for stocks with more stringent short-sale constraints.
Our ndings therefore provide strong evidence in support of the Miller (1977)'s divergence
of opinion hypothesis.
JEL classication: D44, G12, G14.
Keywords: Private placement; Divergence of opinion; Long-run stock returns; Short-sale
constraint; Auction
1 Introduction
Miller (1977) hypothesizes that divergence of opinion can lead to asset over-valuation and
subsequent market under-performance, when pessimistic investors do not take adequate short
positions, for institutional or behavioral reasons.1 In contrast, the risk theory of Williams
(1977) introduces heterogeneous beliefs into the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and
predicts a positive relation between divergence of opinion and expected returns.2 Using
dierent measures of divergence, prior empirical work has not yet generated convincing
evidence for or against Miller's (1977) hypothesis in dierent settings. In this study, we shed
new light on this debate by proposing a novel measure of divergence of opinion based on
auction data. With this new measure, we document strong evidence in support of Miller's
(1977) hypothesis.
One of the main reasons for this ambiguity is that we only have indirect measures for
divergence of opinion (Garnkel, 2009), which might overlap with other risk factors and
contain substantial measurement errors. The most commonly used measure is dispersion
of analyst forecasts. Consistent with Miller's (1977) hypothesis, Diether et al. (2002) nd
stocks with highly dispersed analyst forecasts have lower future returns than stocks with less
dispersed analyst forecasts. However, there are drawbacks of using analyst forecast dispersion
to measure investors' divergence of opinion. First, it is based on forecasts towards earnings,
rather than valuations. Second, investors' decisions may not follow analyst forecasts; thus,
analyst dispersion may not fully reect market participants' divergence of opinion. Third,
it is contaminated by the eect of uncertainty in individual forecasts (Barron et al., 1998;
Sheng and Thevenot, 2012). In line with these concerns, Doukas et al. (2006) document a
positive relation between divergence of opinion and future returns after removing the eect
of uncertainty in analyst forecasts. Johnson (2004) shows that the ndings in Diether et al.
1As summarized by Hong and Stein (2007), there are three mechanisms driving divergence of opinion:
gradual information ow, limited attention, and heterogeneous priors.
2Varian (1985) reaches the same conclusion that heterogeneous beliefs is a risk factor in the Arrow-Debreu
framework. More recently, Veronesi (2000) shows that higher information quality increases expected returns,
supporting Miller's (1977) hypothesis; while consistent with Williams (1977), Epstein and Schneider (2008)
prove that there is an information ambiguity premium for stocks with low information quality.
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(2002) can be explained by the eect of nancial leverage. The other widely used measures,
such as idiosyncratic volatility, turnover, unexplained trading volumes, bid-ask spreads, are
also indirect proxies, which are endogenous to stock prices, and potentially contaminated by
other risk factors. The empirical evidence that relies on these measures is also mixed and
inconclusive.3
These drawbacks make it dicult to conclude whether evidence rejecting (or supporting)
Miller's (1977) hypothesis is due to the theory itself, or the proxy used. In this study, we
revisit Miller's (1977) hypothesis and propose a direct measure of investor opinion regarding
rm value. Our measure is constructed using auction data of private placements in China.
There are two pricing schemes for private placements in the Chinese market: a xed price set
by the board of directors, and an auction price from uniform sealed bids. The former is used
when the issuance targets are internal investors; that is, controlling shareholders and block
holders. The latter is used when the issuance targets are mainly external investors; that is,
institutional investors including mutual funds, trusts, private funds, and asset management
companies, and individual investors.4 All the auction bids information will be publicly
released on the private placement completion announcements. As suggested by Cammack
(1991) and Liu et al. (2001), the divergence of the auction bids would directly reect investors'
heterogeneous beliefs on valuations.5Therefore, this measure largely overcomes the problems
with the existing measures. Our measure is in line with the measure proposed by Garnkel
(2009), who uses proprietary data on investors' limit and market orders in individual stocks
to directly measure their private valuations. However, in contrast to Garnkel's (2009)
measure, our auction based measure is publicly available for a much longer time period.6
3For example, Ang et al. (2006) and Guo and Qiu (2014) nd a negative relation between idiosyncratic
volatility and returns. However, Bali and Cakici (2008) nd no robust relation between idiosyncratic volatility
and stock returns,based on dierent tests. Fu (2009) even documents a positive relation between these two
variables when the expected idiosyncratic volatility is used. Goetzmann and Massa (2005) and Garnkel
and Sokobin (2006) reach dierent conclusions when trading volume is used as the measure of divergence of
opinion.
4See Section 4.2 of this paper for more details on the institutional background of private placements in
China.
5The generalized auction model of Milgrom and Weber (1982a,b) proves that bidders have incentives to
gather extra information to increase their prots in a sealed auction. For a comprehensive review of auction
theory and its applications in corporate nance, we refer readers to Dasgupta and Hansen (2008).
6Garnkel (2009) uses data in a narrower sample period from January 2002 to March 2002. In Garnkel
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One empirical setting that potentially suits the same testing approach is Initial Public
Oering (IPO) auctions. It is possible to construct a dispersion measure based on the bids
data of IPO auctions. However, although the IPO auction has historically been applied in
more than 25 markets, it is currently only available in the U.S., where the usage is rare,
as well as in Vietnam and possibly Israel, where there are restrictions preventing the use of
book building (Jagannathan et al., 2015). More importantly, bids data of IPO auctions is not
publicly available. In contrast, bids data for private placements in China is released with the
completion announcements. Besides auction data, bids data in the book building processes
of IPO and seasonal oering (including private placements) could also potentially reect
investors' private information. Unfortunately, the book building data is also proprietary and
unavailable to public. Overall, to the best of our knowledge, the auction data on private
placement in China is the only publicly available source that can be used to directly measure
investors' divergence of opinions on rm valuations with a large sample size.
To empirically construct this measure, we manually collect 10,425 bid records from 411
private placement auctions, from 2007 to 2015. For each auction, we construct the disper-
sion of bids by two measures. One is the quantity-weighted absolute distance. The other
is the quantity-weighted standard deviation. We then test Miller's (1977) hypothesis by
investigating the relation between the divergence of bids and the long-term performance of
the stock. Our sample ts Miller's (1977) theoretical assumptions since most Chinese rms
face stringent short-sale constraints (Chang et al., 2014).
We summarize the empirical ndings of the current study as follows. First, consistent
with the hypothesis in Miller (1977), we nd a signicantly negative relation between the
divergence of bids and subsequent one-year stock returns for all the four return measures
(raw returns, matched sample returns, market model adjusted, and CAPM adjusted). This
negative relation is robust when controlling for the discount rate of issuing price to the
market price, the scale of the private placement issuance, rm size, market-to-book ratio, cash
holding, ROA, rm age, book leverage, earnings management, year xed eect, and industry
(2009), the author also has not studied the relation between his divergence of opinion measure and future
stock returns.
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xed eect. Besides statistical signicance, we nd that the eect of bids dispersion on
long-term return is also economically signicant: one standard deviation increase in the bids
dispersion | quantity-weighted absolute distance (quantity-weighted standard deviation)
decreases the one-year-ahead raw return, matched sample return, market model adjusted
return, and CAPM adjusted return adjusted return by 7.65% (7.85%), 5.66% (5.72%), 5.18%
(5.21%) and 4.08% (4.10%) respectively.
Second, we test whether our measures of bids dispersion overlap that of analyst forecast
dispersion. We nd that controlling for analyst forecast dispersion does not aect the sig-
nicance of the bids dispersion, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Hence, our measure
of bids dispersion contains new information regarding future long-run stock returns.
Third, Miller's (1977) prediction depends on the presence of short-sale constraints (Boehme
et al., 2006). As a result, we expect that the negative relation between bids divergence and
long-term return would be stronger for rms with more stringent short-sale constraints, ce-
teris paribus. This further helps us evaluate whether the relation is relevant to Miller's
(1977) prediction or merely a spurious correlation resulting from the use of proxy variables.
We construct a measure of rm-level short-sale constraints for our sample rms, based on
the institutional features of Chinese stock market. Consistent with Miller's (1977) hypothe-
sis, we nd that the negative relation is more prevalent for rms with higher magnitude of
short-sale constraints.
Finally, there is a potential selection bias in examining a sample of rms that choose
to renance using private placements and targeting on external investors. To address this
issue, we adopt the sample selection correction procedure in Heckman (1979). We rst t a
probit model to dierentiate rms renaced with private placements and a random sample
of rms that have not renanced. We then use the inverse Mills ratio from the probit
regression as an additional control variable. We also distinguish the rms conducted private
placements with the auction price scheme and ones with the xed price scheme, and control
for the corresponding inverse Mills ratio. The estimation results show that the negative
relation between bids dispersion and long-run return is still robust under these two settings,
suggesting that selection bias is not the driving force.
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Our study contributes to two strands of literature. First, this paper complements and
extends the tests on Miller's (1977) hypothesis, both methodologically and substantively. We
construct a novel and direct measure of divergence of opinion based on auction bids data,
in the unique institutional setting of private placements in China. This measure overcomes
the short-comings of existing proxies in the literature. We document consistent and strong
evidence in support of Miller's (1977) hypothesis.
Second, our paper contributes to the literature on long-run underperformance of private
placements. Dierent factors and theories have been proposed to explain this phenomenon,
including the overvaluation hypothesis (Hertzel et al., 2002), agency problems (Barclay et al.,
2007), and the overoptimism hypothesis Marciukaityte et al. (2005). Our paper sheds new
light on the overvaluation hypothesis of (Hertzel et al., 2002) by identing the role of diver-
gence of opinion in driving overvalution and subsequent long-run underperformance.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We provide the institutional background in
Section 2. In Section 3, we describe the variable construction methods and outline our data.
In Section 4, we present the empirical results. Concluding remarks are given in Section 5.
2 Institutional Background
Private placements is a relatively new, but popular, renancing method. It has been widely
used in many markets since the 1990s, including the U.S., the U.K., Singapore, and New
Zealand (Wruck and Wu, 2009; Armitage, 2010; Chen et al., 2002b; Anderson et al., 2006).7
In terms of China, until 1998, rights issues were the only renancing mode available. In 1998,
public oering of seasoned equity (SEO) was introduced. Starting from May 2000, SEO
became an option for most listed rms when the China Securities Regulation Committee
(CSRC) issued the \Tentative Regulation on Listed Firms Issuing Shares to the Public"
(Bo et al., 2011). In 2005, the split-share structure reform made private placements the
7One reason driving the emerging popularity of private placements since 1990s is the change of regulatory
environment. For instance, in April 1990 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved Rule
144A, which permits immediate sale and re-sale of private placements to \qualied institutional buyers".
This rule signicantly improved the liquidity of private placements as investors were previously required to
either register the securities from private placements with SEC or hold them for at least 1 year.
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predominant equity issue mode, and many controlling shareholders used private placement
as a way to compensate non-tradable shareholders when converting their shares to tradable
(Huang et al., 2016a). The use of private placement has surged since May 2006, when the
CSRC published \Regulatory Measures of Securities Issuance for Listed Companies", and
it has now become the dominating tool for renancing in China. For instance, as shown in
Table 1, from 2014 to 2015, the percentages of proceeds from private placements in total
renancing capacity were both over 97%. In 2015, there were 857 cases of private placements,
no case of SEO, and only ve cases of rights issues. In comparison, Chen et al. (2010b) report
that from 1996 to 2006, there are 148 traditional private placements, 1780 PIPEs and 1734
SEOs in the U.S. market. One reason for the popularity of private placements in China
is that, unlike other renancing modes, the CSRC does not impose requirements regarding
prot sustainability on rms applying to use private placements.8
[Insert Table 1 here]
Figure 1 shows the timeline for a private placement in China, from announcement by
the board of directors, and approval by the shareholder meeting, and regulatory approval by
the CSRC, to the transaction itself, and the announcement of its completion. The lengthy
regulatory process means that a private placement will take more than one year on average
from initial announcement to nal execution (Song, 2014; Fonseka et al., 2014).
[Insert Figure 1 here]
There are three distinctive institutional features of private placements in China. First, the
CSRC requires that the oering/bidding price be no less than 90% of the average stock price
for the 20 days prior to the benchmark date. In practice, rms tend to set the benchmark
date as the day the announcement is made by boards of directors, although shareholder
meeting date or the date of the subscription invitation letter could also be adopted (Fonseka
et al., 2014). Second, there are two dierent pricing schemes: xed price and auction. The
8For instance, rms applying for rights issues must demonstrate persistent positive prots for the latest
three years. For SEO and convertible bond issues, rms must have a weighted average of return on net assets
of no less than 6% for the latest three years.
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price of the equities is determined by the board of directors when the issuance targets of the
private placements are strategic investors, controlling shareholders and block holders (Top
10 shareholders), or investors seeking to become controlling shareholders through private
placements. The price of the equities is set by a uniform sealed bid auction when the
issuance targets are mainly external investors. In the later scheme, controlling shareholders
and block holders can still be involved in a private placement, but they cannot participate
in the auction and can only purchase the predetermined amount of shares with the auction
price. Third, the locking period is 36 months for all internal investors (in both xed price
scheme and auction scheme), and 12 months for external investors.
In this paper, we focus on samples using the auction pricing scheme. Figure 1 shows
that rms announce the transaction details in the last phase of the private placement. In
the case of using the sealed auction pricing scheme, the details on the bids are also reported.
Table 2 shows the example of the private placement deal bidding book of the Xibang Com-
pany (002536.SZ). The table is copied and translated from the completion announcement
announced by the company on June 1, 2015. The table shows that each bid records the
identity of the bidder, and the price and quantity of the bid. We can see that participants
include mutual funds, trusts, asset management companies, and individual investors. The
bidding prices vary widely, ranging from 23.00 to 37.58. With this comprehensive records of
bids, we can measure to what what extent the bidding prices are divergent, which reects
investors' heterogeneous beliefs regarding rm value (Cammack, 1991; Liu et al., 2001).
[Insert Table 2 here]
3 Data and Variable Denitions
3.1 Data sources and sample attributes
We manually collected all the bids data from announcements made by listed companies that
successfully issued private placements from January 2, 2007 to December 31, 2015. All the
announcements are downloaded from the WIND database. There are 672 private placement
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deals using the sealed bid auction during this time period.9 We exclude \ST" (special
treatment) or \PT" (particular transfer) rms which are particularly monitored due to their
poor performances.10 We also exclude rms with long trading halts within two years from the
completion date of a private placement. We are nally left with 411 auction cases with 10,425
bids in total. We obtain data on nancial information, stock returns, and analyst forecasts
from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research Database (CSMAR) created by the
Guotaian Information Technology Company (GTA).
3.2 Variables construction
We use the dispersion of the auction bidding prices to measure investors' divergence of
opinion. To construct the bidding price dispersion, we rst follow Liu et al. (2001) and
use the quantity-weighted standard deviation of the bidding prices, scaled by the weighted
average price. We denote this variable as SD. We also construct another dispersion measure
WAD, which is the quantity weighted absolute distance of the bidding prices, scaled by the
weighted average price.
The dependent variable for our empirical study is the post-private placement long-run
stock performance. Our main analysis focuses on one year performance to be consistent with
the locking period, while two years performance is also considered for a robustness check. To
measure the long-run performance, we use four kinds of returns with dierent benchmarks.
The rst return is raw, which is measured by the holding period return of the stock from
one day after the private placement completion announcement date to one year later. As a
robustness check, we exclude the rst month following the private placement announcement
date to rule out the short-term announcement eect. The second return is matched, which
is constructed by the dierence between raw and the holding period return of a matched
9There are 1810 private placements wtih the xed price scheme from 2007 to 2015.
10In the Chinese stock markets, a rm that has negative prots for two consecutive years will be designated
as \ST" rm. If an \ST rm continues to generate losses for one more year, it will be designated as \PT"
rm and will be delisted if it cannot have a positive prot within another year. The shares of ST rms are
traded with a 5% price change limit every day, compared to the 10% limit for normal rms. The semi-annual
nancial reports of \ST rms must be audited. The shares of PT rms can only be traded on Fridays, with
a maximum 5% upside limit to last Fridays closing price, but there is no limit on the downside (Jia et al.,
2013).
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rm for the same period. Firms are matched on size, book-to-market ratio, and industry,
following Barber and Lyon (1997). The third return is market, which is the raw return
minus the market index return of the same period. The fourth return is capm, which is the
 from the CAPM model.
We also include several variables concerning the characteristics of the private placement
deals and the fundamentals of the issuing rms in our empirical study. The auction deal
characteristics are percentage and discount. percentage is the number of issuing shares in
the private placement over the rm's total shares outstanding. It reects the relative size
of the private placement deal, or the dilution level of the deal. As in Chen et al. (2015),
discount is the discount rate of the issuing price compared to the market price of the rm
one day before the issuance announcement. The fundamentals of the rm include rm size
log(value), Tobin's Q, cash holding cash, firmage, and book leverage lev. log(value) is the
log of market value of the rm. Q is the market-to-book ratio of the rm.11 cash is the cash
and cash equivalent over the total asset. firmage is the age of the rm. lev is the total
debt over the total asset. We use the values of these control variables in the nancial year
covering the private placement completion dates in the empirical tests.
Besides these variables, our study also includes two important control variables. The
rst one is dispersion, which is the standard deviation of analyst earnings forecasts in the
previous year, scaled by the book value per share. It is the most commonly used proxy for
divergence of opinion (Diether et al., 2002; Johnson, 2004; Doukas et al., 2006; Sadka and
Scherbina, 2007). The second one is em, which is a proxy for earnings management. Chi and
Gupta (2009) propose that overvaluation-induced income-increasing earnings management
leads to lower future stock return, and Chen et al. (2010a) conrm this relation in the context
of private placements. We construct em following the adjusted Jones Model by Dechow et al.
(1995):
TAt=Assett 1 = 1
1
Assett 1
+ 2
REVt
Assett 1
+ 3
PPEt
Assett 1
+ t (1)
11Following Han and Pan (2016), we measure the market value of stocks as the market value of tradable
shares due to the concern that it is hard to measure the market value of nontradable shares accurately.
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em = TAt=Assett 1   [^1
1
Assett 1
+ ^2
REVt  RECt
Assett 1
+ ^3
PPEt
Assett 1
] (2)
where TA is the total accruals; REV is the change of revenues; PPE is the gross property
plant and equipment; Asset is the total asset; REC is the change of net receivables.
We rst employ equation (1) to estimate 1, 2, and 3. Then we construct the earnings
management measure em by equation (2). In addition, short:c is a dummy variable which is
equal to 0 if the rm is in the margin trading list or in the CSI300 index list, and 1 otherwise.
It is a proxy for short-sale constraint.
3.3 Summary Statistics
Table 3 presents summary statistics. Panel A reports the characteristics of the bids. The
total number of bids is 10,425. The mean (median) bidding price is 17.112 (14.200). The
mean (median) quantity of each bid is 31,130 thousand (7,000 thousands). The mean (me-
dian) dollar value of each bid is 8,941 thousand (2,556 thousands). Panel B reports the
descriptive statistics at the rm level. The total number of deals in 411. The mean (median)
value of the dispersion of bidding price WAD is 0.081 (0.044). The mean (median) value of
the other dispersion measure of bidding price SD is 0.098 (0.053). On average, the winning
bids percentage per auction is 64.7%. We note that the 75% quantile of this variable is 1,
indicating that at least 25% of the private placement auctions were with only a single bidder
or multiple bidders with the exact same bid. To alleviate the efect of these observations,
we exclude the private placement cases with less than 5 bidders as a robustness check. The
mean (median) discount rate of the issuing price is 16.678% (16.740%). The mean (median)
quantity of issuing shares is 154,980 thousands (53,640 thousands). The mean (median)
percentage of issuing shares over the total shares outstanding is 1.4%(1.2%). Only 22.2% of
the rms in our sample are in the margin trading list or in the CSI300 index list, conrm-
ing the argument in Chang et al. (2014) that Chinese stock market has stringent short-sale
constraints.
[Insert Table 3 here]
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In Table 4, we report descriptive statistics and t statistics of one year long-run perfor-
mance variables. raw has a mean (median) of -5.5% (-8.6%). matched has a mean (median)
of -6.2% (-8.3%). market has a mean (median) of -3.8% (-5.2%). capm has a mean (median)
of -10.4% (-10.3%). Overall, the mean and median of the four variables are all signicantly
negative. This is consistent with the phenomena of long-run underperformance of private
placements in U.S. (Hertzel et al., 2002) and China (Huang et al., 2016a).12
[Insert Table 4 here]
4 Empirical results
In this section, we rst analyze the eect of bidding price dispersion on the stock long-run
performance. We also control for the most commonly used proxy for divergence of opinion
| the dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts. Furthermore, we examine the eect of short-
sale constraint on the relation between bidding price dispersion and long-run returns. We
then address the potential selection bias by performing the Heckman (1979) sample selection
correction procedure. Finally, we conduct several robustness checks.
4.1 Baseline regressions
We perform regressions of the long-run performance on bidding price dispersion. The depen-
dent variables are four return measures described in Section 3.2 . The independent variables
are the dispersion of bidding prices WAD or SD, the percentage of shares issuing over total
shares outstanding percentage, the rm size log(value), Tobin's Q measure Q, the discount
rate of the issuing price to the market price discount, the cash holding ratio cash, the return
to asset ratio ROA, the age of the rm firmage, the book leverage lev. We also include
year-xed eect and industry-xed eect to control for overall macroeconomic factors over
time and industry characteristics. Industry is dened based on the 22 industries classied
by the CSRC.
12As reported in Table 3, the mean value of discount rate is 16.67%. Henceforth, the negative long-run
performance does not indicate that the participants in the auctions would suer a loss on average.
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We report the results in Table 5. The coecients of WAD and SD are all signicantly
negative. Specically, the coecients of WAD (SD) are -0.612 (-0.510), -0.453 (-0.372),
-0.414 (-0.338), and -0.327 (-0.266) for the four return variables, respectively. The results
are consistent with the prediction of Miller (1977), that the higher the divergence of opinion,
the worse the long-run performance. The coecients of Tobin's Q are all positive and
signicant at the 1% level, indicating that private placement deals are more valuable for
rms with higher investment opportunities. discount is measured as the discount rate of
the issuing price to the market price. There is a signicantly negative relation between
discount and all four return measures. This result is in line with the empirical ndings in
Bajaj et al. (2001),Krishnamurthy et al. (2005), and Barclay et al. (2007), and is consistent
with the argument provided by Hertzel et al. (2002) that private placement discount reects
overvaluation. In contrast to Chen et al. (2010a) who document a signicant negative relation
between earnings management and long-run private placement return in the U.S. market, we
fail to nd any signicant relation in our context. This dierence could be due to fact that in
China a private placement takes on average more than one year to complete. The valuation
eect of earnings management would diminish in such a long term period. Moreover, the
participants in the priveate placements are sophisticated investors who would be able to
detect the earnings management in a reasonablely long time period.
In terms of economic signicance, an increase of one standard deviation of our key variable
WAD (SD) will decrease the long-run return raw by 7.65% (7.85%), matched by 5.66%
(5.72%),market by 5.18% (5.21%) and capm by 4.08% (4.10%) respectively. The magnitudes
of the economic signicance are relatively large, compared to the mean values of the long-run
returns (-8.6%, -8.3%, -5.2%, -10.3%).
Overall, we nd a signicantly negative relation between the bidding price dispersion and
the long-run stock performance. Our ndings support Miller (1977)'s prediction.
[Insert Table 5 here]
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4.2 Control for analyst forecast dispersion
The most commonly used proxy for divergence of opinion in the extant literature is the
dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts. For example, Diether et al. (2002) nd a negative
relation between the dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts and future stock returns, while
Doukas et al. (2006) draw the opposite conclusion. To test if our key measure provides
additional information beyond the dispersion of analyst forecasts, we add it as an additional
control variable in the baseline regressions. The forecast dispersion is constructed by the
standard deviation of analyst's earning forecasts in the previous year, scaled by the book
value per share of the rm. The analyst dispersion measure is positively correlated with
our bids dispersion measures with moderate correlation magnitudes (0.094 with WAD and
0.113 with SD).
Table 6 reports the regression results. The coecients of WAD and SD remain sig-
nicantly negative. The magnitudes of the coecients are close to those in the baseline
regressions. The coecients of the analyst earnings forecasts are all negative, but not statis-
tically signicant. Henceforth, the results suggest that the information of our key measures
for divergence of opinion is not covered by the dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts.
[Insert Table 6 here]
4.3 Short-sale constraint
Miller (1977) hypothesizes that stock price subject to high dierences of opinion and short-
sale constraints are biased upward. Our previous empirical tests show that dispersion of
opinion drives the stock price to be overvalued. However, short-sale constraints is another
critical condition for Miller (1977)'s hypothesis (Boehme et al., 2006).13 We predict that
if the short-sale constraint of a stock is more binding, the price will be more overvalued,
given the same level of dierences in opinion. To test this prediction, we perform regressions
by interacting the dispersion measure WAD (SD) with the short-sale constraint measure
short:c.
13Chen et al. (2002a) prove that Miller (1977)'s hypothesis holds in practice, as long as there is a high
short-sale cost or other trading frictions.
13
In Chinese stock markets, a stock can be shorted in two ways (Gu et al., 2016). The
rst is to borrow stocks from brokers. However, only those stocks appearing in a margin
trading and short-selling list selected by the CSRC are available to borrow.14 Therefore, we
expect that stocks in the list incur fewer short-sale constraints. We obtain the list from the
CSRC website. The second way to short the stock is to short the CSI300 (China Securities
Index 300) index futures, if the stock is one of the 300 underlying stocks, and long the
remaining stocks in the CSI 300 index list.15 We therefore expect that stocks in the CSI 300
list also face less stringent short-sale constraint. We source the CSI 300 index compositions
information from the China Securities Index Corporation (http://www.csindex.com.cn).
Based on these institutional features, our short-sale constraint proxy (short:c) is dened as a
dummy variable which is equal to zero if the stock is in the margin trading and short selling
list or in the CSI 300 list, and one otherwise.
Table 7 reports the regression results. We can see that the coecients of the interaction
term are all negative for the four returns and are statistically signicant formarket, matched
and capm. The coecients of the dispersion measuresWAD and SD remain negative for all
four returns measures. Considering the results in combination, we can conclude that short:c
strengthens the negative relation between divergence of opinion and long-run stock returns.
This is consistent with our prediction that if a stock faces stronger short-sale constraint, its
price will be more overvalued given the same level of divegence of opinion.
[Insert Table 7 here]
4.4 Sample selection bias
Two kinds of potential selection bias can arise when examining a sample of rms issuing
private placements by the auction method. The rst is that rms self-select to issue a
private placement or not. The second is that rms which issue private placements self-select
the issuing method, that is, auction or xed price. Heckman (1979) proposes a solution
14The short-selling and margin trading scheme was launched in March 2010 (Chang et al., 2014; Gu et al.,
2016).
15The China Financial Futures Exchange introduced index futures against the CSI 300 index on April 16,
2010 (Han and Pan, 2016).
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to mitigate sample selection bias by using his sample selection correction. This involves
a rst-step probit regression to dierentiate between selected rms and unselected rms.
Following Bo et al. (2011), Huang et al. (2016b), and Huang et al. (2016a), we use Tobin's
Q measure(Q), rm size (log(value)), rm age (firmage), cash holding ratio (cash), book
leverage (lev), protability as measured by the ratio of earnings before interest over total
asset (profitability), investment as measured by the capital expenditure over total asset
(investment), industry dummies and year dummies as the determinants of the rm's private
placement decision. Hence, we run the following probit regression:
D(Firm=1,0)=f(log(value),Q, firmage, cash, profitability, investment, lev, industry
dummies, year dummies)
To address the selection bias, we conduct the rst stage of Heckman two-stage regressions
with dierent sample settings. In the rst setting, our selected rms are those issuing private
placement by both xed price and auction methods, and our unselected rms are those not
renanced in the same period. It is notable that during our sample period, private placements
is the dominating renancing mode in China. As a result, we have not investigated rms'
choice between private placements and SEO as in Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005) and Chen
et al. (2010b) among others. In the second setting, our selected rms are those issuing private
placements by the auction method, but our unselected rms are the rms issuing private
placements by the xed price method.
The rst stage estimation results are presented in Table 8. Panel A shows the result
for the rst setting. Consistent with Huang et al. (2016a), we nd that rms with higher
Tobin's Q are more likely to issue private placements, suggesting that Chinese rms time the
market and use private placements to issue overpriced shares. We also nd that rms with
larger size, higher protability and investment are more likely to conduct private placements,
either because they have more renancing needs or because CSRC are more likely to approve
the applications of such rms (Bo et al., 2011; Huang et al., 2016b). In Panel B, we explore
rms' decision to adopt the acution method in contrast to the xed price method. It is
noteworthy that the coecient of Tobin's Q turns to be negative. This conrms again the
market timing hypothesis of Huang et al. (2016a) as compared to the xed price method, it
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is more dicult for rms to control the oering price in the auction method.
[Insert Table 8 here]
Step two of the Heckman (1979) sample selection correction uses the inverse Mills ratio
from the probit regression as an independent variable in the baseline regressions. The second
stage regression results for these two settings are presented in Table 9 and Table 10. From
the tables, we can see that the coecients of WAD and SD are signicantly negative, with
similar magnitudes as shown in the baseline regressions. Collectively, our results suggest
that the negative relation between bids dispersion and future long-run return is not driven
by the sample selection bias.
[Insert Table 9 here]
[Insert Table 10 here]
4.5 Robustness Checks
In our previous results, we dene the long-run performance as the returns from one day after
the announcement date to one year later. To show that our results are robust to dierent
time horizons, we recalculate all four returns in two ways.
The rst is to recalculate all four returns from one month after the completion announce-
ment date to one year later to rule out the short-term announcement eect. We report
the regression results in Table 11. The coecients of WAD and SD remain signicantly
negative. The magnitudes are close to those in the baseline regressions.
[Insert Table 11 here]
The second way is to use two years long-run performance from one day after the an-
nouncement date to two years later. We report the regression results in Table 12. The
coecients of WAD and SD remain negative and statistically signicant. The magnitudes
are also close to those in the baseline regressions.
[Insert Table 12 here]
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Besides using other denitions for long-run performances, we conduct an additional ro-
bustness check by excluding the auctions with less than ve bidders. We conduct this
robustness check to address the concern that the a small number of bidders would aect the
eectiveness of our dispersion measures. However, as we nd in Table 13, this experiment
has not altered our estimation results both qualitatively and quantitatively.
[Insert Table 13 here]
5 Conclusion
Existing studies provide mixed evidence on the relation between investors' heterogeneous
beliefs and future stock returns. The current study advances the literature by proposing a
novel measure of divergence of opinion, based on auction data for private placements. Our
measures are the rst to directly reect investors' private information regarding rm value
based on publicly available data. In this way, we overcome the concerns about the existing
indirect measures in the literature. Based on this measure, we document that the long-term
performance of stock returns is negatively related to the divergence of opinion. This relation
is economically meaningful, and robust when controlling for other rm characteristics, earn-
ings management, analyst forecast dispersion, and self-selection bias. Further, we nd that
the eect of divergence of opinion is more prevalent for rms with more stringent short-sale
constraints. Overall, our evidence supports Miller (1977) overvaluation hypothesis rather
than Williams (1977) risk theory. Our ndings, together with the facts that the auction bids
data is publicly available and our measures are easy to construct, also oer practitioners in
the secondary private placements market an appealing means to predict the returns.
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Figure 1 Timeline of Private Placements in China
This gure shows the process a private placement is carried out in China. The upper gure details the 5
phases and the lower gure lists the correspond time of a randomly selected rm Xibang Company who
conducted the private placement from 2014 to 2015.
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Table 1 A Comparison of Renancing Modes in China: 2007-2015
This table reports the frequency and proceeds (in billion CNY) of three main renancing modes in China:
private placement, seasoned oering (SEO) and rights issues. The time period is from 2007 to 2015. The
data is collected from the WIND database.
Year No. of Private Placement Proceeds No. of SEO Proceeds No. of Rights Issues Proceeds Percentage of Private Placement (Proceeds)
2007 149 274.46 29 66.43 7 23.09 75.41%
2008 105 170.24 27 45.89 8 13.65 74.09%
2009 117 256.64 13 23.19 9 10.08 88.52%
2010 160 313.63 10 37.72 21 14.98 62.57%
2011 171 346.48 10 28.88 12 34.72 84.49%
2012 156 361.12 6 11.55 7 6.87 95.15%
2013 281 344.02 5 7.02 13 45.70 86.71%
2014 486 681.85 1 0.37 14 13.74 97.97%
2015 857 1372.21 0 0 5 15.50 98.83%
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Table 2 Bidding book example: Xibang Company (002536.SZ)
This table reports the bidding book of the private placement by Xibang Company (002536.SZ). The winning
price in this auction is 36.02.
Order Bidder Price Quantity(thousand)
1 Gongqingchenghuafu Investment Partner 30.20 110,000
2 Gongqingchenghuafu Investment Partner 28.20 220,000
3 Gongqingchenghuafu Investment Partner 24.60 330,000
4 Jianxing Fund Management Company 26.00 130,000
5 Shangyinruijin Capital Management Company 26.30 55,000
6 Beijing Qianshichuangfu Capital Management Company 28.00 55,000
7 Beijing Qianshichuangfu Capital Management Company 25.00 55,000
8 Beijing Qianshichuangfu Capital Management Company 23.00 60,000
9 Cantong Fund Management Company 33.77 115,100
10 Cantong Fund Management Company 32.41 188,620
11 Cantong Fund Management Company 33.77 115,100
12 Donghai Fund Management Company 31.05 70,000
13 Donghai Fund Management Company 30.51 140,000
14 Huafu Fund Management Company 37.50 200,000
15 Huabao Trust Company 37.58 78,000
16 Zhang Huaibin 32.15 55,000
17 Zhang Huaibin 30.15 60,000
18 Zhang Huaibin 28.65 65,000
19 Zhaoshang Wealth Asset Management Company 34.66 165,000
20 Zhaoshang Wealth Asset Management Company 34.01 165,000
21 Zhaoshang Wealth Asset Management Company 33.51 165,000
22 Chuangjinhexin Fund Company 37.28 65,240
23 Chuangjinhexin Fund Company 32.13 120,240
24 Chuangjinhexin Fund Company 31.21 176,040
25 Guohuarenshou Insurance Company 35.05 56,000
26 Huitianfu Fund Company 36.02 55,000
27 Huitianfu Fund Company 34.22 70,000
28 Huitianfu Fund Company 32.22 100,000
29 Xinzheng Security Asset Management Company 30.00 75,000
30 Pingandahua Fund Company 36.00 90,000
31 Nuoan Fund Company 37.00 138,190
32 Nuoan Fund Company 34.50 148,200
33 Nuoan Fund Company 34.40 148,630
34 Shenwanlinxin Shanghai Asset Management Company 32.13 110,000
35 Xingye Wealth Asset Management Company 31.00 55,180
36 Xingye Wealth Asset Management Company 30.00 55,500
37 Xingye Wealth Asset Management Company 29.00 58,000
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Table 3 Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics on the 411 private placements and 10,425 bids in our sample. In Panel
A, price is the price of the bid. quantity is the number of shares of the bid. winprice is the lowest price
to win the shares. totaldollar is the dollar value of the bid. In Panel B, WAD is the quantity weighted
absolute distance, scaled by the weighted average of bidding price. SD is the quantity weighted standard
deviation of all bidding price for one private placement deal, scaled by the weighted average of the bidding
price. winpercentage is the number of wining bids over the number of all bids for the private placement
deal. discount is the discount rate of the issuing price compared to the market price. totalquantity is the
total number of the bidding shares for the private placement deal. percentage is the number of the issuing
shares in the private placement over the total shares outstanding of the rm. shareoutstand is the total
shares outstanding of the rm. marketvalue is the market value of the rm. Q is the market to book ratio
of the rm. bookvalue is the book value of the rm. cash is the cash and cash equivalent over total assets.
ROA is return on assets. firmage is the age of the rm. lev is the total debt over total assets. short:c
is a dummy variable which equals 0 if the rm is in the margin trading list or in the CSI300 index, and 1
otherwise. dispersion is the standard deviation of analyst earninsg forecasts, scaled by the book value per
share. em is a proxy for earnings management, which is calculated from the adjusted Jones Model.
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75)
Panel A: Bid level
price 10,425 17.112 12.365 8.900 14.200 21.320
quantity(thousand) 10,425 31,130 615,607 3,500 7,000 15,000
winprice 10,425 18.211 13.497 9.210 15.100 22.910
totaldollar(thousand) 10,425 8,941 132,416 1,237 2,556 5,464
Panel B: Firm Level
WAD 411 0.081 0.125 0.012 0.044 0.102
SD 411 0.098 0.154 0.014 0.053 0.126
winpercentage 411 0.647 0.340 0.301 0.714 1.000
discount(%) 411 16.678 15.739 8.565 16.740 25.115
totalquantity(thousand) 411 154,980 937,108 25,470 53,640 106,660
percentage 411 0.014 0.010 0.007 0.012 0.019
sharesoutstand(million) 411 804 1,674 297 463 807
marketvalue(million) 411 11,496 15,003 4,257 7,185 13,580
Q 411 2.526 1.993 1.228 1.953 3.215
bookvalue(million) 411 8,357 35,021 2,000 3,350 6,600
cash 411 0.199 0.128 0.097 0.172 0.273
ROA 411 0.041 0.041 0.018 0.038 0.060
firmage 411 13.489 4.921 10 13 16
lev 411 0.429 0.183 0.291 0.418 0.571
short:c 411 0.778 0.416 0 0 0
dispersion 365 0.069 0.061 0.032 0.051 0.083
em 411 0.047 0.170 -0.020 0.020 0.091
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Table 4 Long-run performance
This table reports the summary statistics and t statistics of the long-run performance day 1 after the
announcement to one year later. raw is the one year holding period return of the stock. matched is raw
minus the matched rm's return of the same period. market is raw minus the market index return of the
same period. capm is the abnormal return adjusted by CAPM model. The returns are winsored at 1% to
rule out outliers.
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Median t statistic
raw 411 -0.055 0.317 -0.086 -3.280
matched 411 -0.062 0.351 -0.083 -3.378
market 411 -0.038 0.270 -0.052 -2.650
capm 411 -0.104 0.302 -0.103 -6.553
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Table 5 Bids dispersion and long-run performance
This table reports the results of regressions of one year performance on bids dispersion of private placements.
The one year performance is proxied by four variables. raw is the one year holding period return of the stock.
matched is raw minus the matched rm's return of the same period.market is raw minus the market index
return of the same period. capm is the abnormal return adjusted by CAPM model.WAD is the quantity
weighted absolute distance, scaled by the weighted average of bidding price. SD is the quantity weighted
standard deviation of all bidding price for one private placement deal, scaled by the weighted average of the
bidding price. percentage is the number of the issuing shares in the private placement over the total shares
outstanding of the rm. log(value) is log of market value of the rm. Q is the market to book ratio of the
rm. cash is the cash and cash equivalent over total assets. ROA is return on assets. firmage is the age of
the rm. lev is the total debt over total assets. discount is the discount rate of the issuing price compared
to the market price. em is a proxy for earning management, which is calculated from adjusted Jones Model.
We report the t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
raw matched market capm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
WAD  0.612  0.453  0.414  0.327
( 3.015) ( 2.162) ( 2.330) ( 2.077)
SD  0.510  0.372  0.338  0.266
( 3.078) ( 2.173) ( 2.331) ( 2.064)
percentage 4.110 4.140 3.255 3.286 2.120 2.150 1.706 1.733
(1.634) (1.648) (1.254) (1.267) (0.963) (0.977) (0.874) (0.888)
log(value)  0.086  0.086  0.092  0.092  0.071  0.071  0.094  0.095
( 2.488) ( 2.496) ( 2.580) ( 2.588) ( 2.330) ( 2.339) ( 3.518) ( 3.527)
Q 0.081 0.082 0.097 0.097 0.076 0.076 0.073 0.073
(4.359) (4.395) (5.040) (5.056) (4.685) (4.702) (5.057) (5.068)
discount  0.008  0.008  0.007  0.007  0.006  0.006  0.005  0.005
( 5.437) ( 5.414) ( 4.856) ( 4.840) ( 4.971) ( 4.955) ( 3.953) ( 3.940)
cash  0.196  0.202  0.088  0.092 0.037 0.034 0.100 0.097
( 0.928) ( 0.955) ( 0.401) ( 0.420) (0.202) (0.181) (0.609) (0.591)
ROA 1.149 1.165 0.454 0.464 0.590 0.599 0.531 0.537
(1.761) (1.786) (0.674) (0.689) (1.034) (1.049) (1.049) (1.061)
Firmage 0.012 0.012 0.014 0.013 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
(2.614) (2.609) (2.738) (2.735) (1.752) (1.749) (1.843) (1.841)
lev 0.209 0.212 0.234 0.236 0.347 0.349 0.302 0.303
(1.201) (1.217) (1.305) (1.314) (2.280) (2.289) (2.238) (2.245)
em  0.042  0.042 0.060 0.060  0.072  0.072  0.020  0.020
( 0.324) ( 0.321) (0.446) (0.450) ( 0.637) ( 0.632) ( 0.203) ( 0.198)
Constant 0.331 0.331 0.479 0.480 0.576 0.577 1.115 1.116
(0.604) (0.604) (0.847) (0.849) (1.202) (1.204) (2.624) (2.626)
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 411
R2 0.417 0.418 0.322 0.322 0.224 0.224 0.210 0.210
Adjusted R2 0.366 0.367 0.263 0.263 0.156 0.156 0.141 0.141
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Table 6 Bids dispersion and long-run performance (control analyst dispersion)
This table reports the results of regressions of one year performance on bids dispersion of private placements
controlling for analyst dispersion.The one year performance is proxied by four variables. raw is the one
year holding period return of the stock. matched is raw minus the matched rm's return of the same
period.market is raw minus the market index return of the same period. capm is the abnormal return
adjusted by CAPM model.WAD is the quantity weighted absolute distance, scaled by the weighted average
of bidding price. SD is the quantity weighted standard deviation of all bidding price for one private placement
deal, scaled by the weighted average of the bidding price. percentage is the number of the issuing shares
in the private placement over the total shares outstanding of the rm. log(value) is log of market value of
the rm. Q is the market to book ratio of the rm. cash is the cash and cash equivalent over total assets.
ROA is return on assets. firmage is the age of the rm. lev is the total debt over total assets. discount is
the discount rate of the issuing price compared to the market price. em is a proxy for earning management,
which is calculated from adjusted Jones Model. dispersion is the standard deviation of analyst earning
forecasts, scaled by the book value per share. We report the t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote
signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
raw matched market capm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
WAD  0.637  0.470  0.427  0.319
( 3.030) ( 2.167) ( 2.299) ( 1.958)
SD  0.529  0.388  0.350  0.261
( 3.080) ( 2.188) ( 2.306) ( 1.954)
percentage 4.963 5.004 4.167 4.202 3.480 3.515 2.991 3.019
(1.636) (1.651) (1.330) (1.341) (1.298) (1.312) (1.270) (1.283)
log(value)  0.093  0.094  0.091  0.091  0.080  0.081  0.101  0.102
( 2.511) ( 2.523) ( 2.372) ( 2.381) ( 2.447) ( 2.458) ( 3.516) ( 3.527)
Q 0.093 0.094 0.103 0.104 0.084 0.084 0.081 0.081
(4.389) (4.412) (4.718) (4.730) (4.476) (4.486) (4.911) (4.917)
discount  0.007  0.007  0.007  0.007  0.006  0.006  0.004  0.004
( 4.683) ( 4.658) ( 4.315) ( 4.296) ( 4.336) ( 4.318) ( 3.397) ( 3.382)
cash  0.172  0.178  0.125  0.129 0.061 0.057 0.092 0.089
( 0.754) ( 0.781) ( 0.530) ( 0.549) (0.302) (0.282) (0.519) (0.503)
ROA 1.499 1.521 0.527 0.543 0.890 0.903 0.914 0.924
(1.982) (2.010) (0.675) (0.694) (1.331) (1.350) (1.557) (1.573)
Firmage 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009
(3.067) (3.068) (2.900) (2.901) (2.219) (2.220) (2.238) (2.239)
lev 0.271 0.273 0.152 0.153 0.390 0.390 0.336 0.337
(1.397) (1.405) (0.758) (0.763) (2.272) (2.276) (2.231) (2.234)
em  0.129  0.127  0.014  0.013  0.108  0.107  0.056  0.056
( 0.798) ( 0.788) ( 0.084) ( 0.077) ( 0.762) ( 0.754) ( 0.451) ( 0.444)
dispersion  0.267  0.249  0.180  0.166  0.150  0.137  0.363  0.354
( 0.590) ( 0.550) ( 0.385) ( 0.356) ( 0.375) ( 0.343) ( 1.036) ( 1.009)
Constant 0.378 0.379 0.486 0.488 0.594 0.596 1.162 1.164
(0.642) (0.645) (0.800) (0.802) (1.142) (1.145) (2.544) (2.548)
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 365 365 365 365 365 365 365 365
R2 0.414 0.415 0.338 0.338 0.224 0.225 0.227 0.227
Adjusted R2 0.356 0.356 0.272 0.272 0.147 0.147 0.150 0.150
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Table 7 Counting for short-sale constraints
This table reports the results of regressions of one year performance on bids dispersion of private placements
counting for short-sale constraints. The one year performance is proxied by four variables. raw is the one
year holding period return of the stock. matched is raw minus the matched rm's return of the same
period.market is raw minus the market index return of the same period. capm is the abnormal return
adjusted by CAPM model.WAD is the quantity weighted absolute distance, scaled by the weighted average
of bidding price. SD is the quantity weighted standard deviation of all bidding price for one private placement
deal, scaled by the weighted average of the bidding price. percentage is the number of the issuing shares
in the private placement over the total shares outstanding of the rm. log(value) is log of market value of
the rm. Q is the market to book ratio of the rm. cash is the cash and cash equivalent over total assets.
ROA is return on assets. firmage is the age of the rm. lev is the total debt over total assets. discount is
the discount rate of the issuing price compared to the market price. em is a proxy for earning management,
which is calculated from adjusted Jones Model. dispersion is the standard deviation of analyst earning
forecasts, scaled by the book value per share. short:c is a dummy variable which is equal to 0 if the rm is in
the margin trading list or in the CSI300 index list, and 1 otherwise. We report the t-statistics in parentheses.
***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
raw matched market capm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
WAD  0.618  0.385  0.307  0.179
( 2.834) ( 1.722) ( 1.619) ( 1.051)
WADshort:c  0.427  1.028  0.848  0.747
( 0.843) ( 1.974) ( 1.919) ( 1.919)
SD  0.505  0.315  0.244  0.141
( 2.863) ( 1.736) ( 1.600) ( 1.029)
SDshort:c  0.379  0.873  0.722  0.636
( 0.899) ( 2.014) ( 1.965) ( 1.965)
short:c  0.090  0.086 0.020 0.024  0.083  0.079  0.061  0.058
( 1.021) ( 0.972) (0.223) (0.264) ( 1.076) ( 1.027) ( 0.903) ( 0.855)
percentage 3.920 3.962 3.158 3.165 2.519 2.527 2.483 2.481
(1.307) (1.322) (1.024) (1.027) (0.965) (0.968) (1.077) (1.076)
log(value)  0.063  0.064  0.084  0.085  0.045  0.046  0.064  0.065
( 1.687) ( 1.708) ( 2.177) ( 2.201) ( 1.378) ( 1.404) ( 2.232) ( 2.257)
Q 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
(4.332) (4.354) (4.879) (4.893) (4.609) (4.619) (4.935) (4.940)
discount  0.007  0.007  0.007  0.007  0.006  0.006  0.004  0.004
( 4.558) ( 4.538) ( 4.385) ( 4.379) ( 4.281) ( 4.278) ( 3.309) ( 3.311)
cash  0.100  0.105  0.103  0.104 0.019 0.019 0.073 0.074
( 0.488) ( 0.508) ( 0.488) ( 0.490) (0.106) (0.105) (0.463) (0.468)
ROA 1.604 1.622 0.584 0.592 0.763 0.768 0.770 0.771
(2.142) (2.165) (0.759) (0.769) (1.170) (1.177) (1.337) (1.338)
Firmage 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.011 0.011 0.009 0.009
(3.084) (3.090) (2.914) (2.924) (2.443) (2.454) (2.300) (2.312)
lev 0.390 0.392 0.256 0.257 0.359 0.360 0.318 0.319
(2.202) (2.211) (1.403) (1.411) (2.330) (2.336) (2.336) (2.341)
dispersion  0.375  0.357  0.293  0.281  0.319  0.309  0.537  0.531
( 0.852) ( 0.813) ( 0.647) ( 0.622) ( 0.833) ( 0.808) ( 1.589) ( 1.571)
em  0.157  0.156  0.049  0.048  0.140  0.139  0.096  0.095
( 0.987) ( 0.981) ( 0.301) ( 0.292) ( 1.008) ( 0.999) ( 0.785) ( 0.776)
Constant 0.024 0.029 0.416 0.425 0.231 0.240 0.738 0.746
(0.042) (0.051) (0.707) (0.722) (0.464) (0.481) (1.676) (1.694)
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 365 365 365 365 365 365 365 365
R2 0.426 0.427 0.351 0.351 0.254 0.254 0.253 0.253
Adjusted R2 0.365 0.366 0.282 0.282 0.174 0.175 0.173 0.174
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Table 8 Heckman two stage for sample selection: stage 1
This table reports the rst stage results of Heckman two stage. The dependent variable PPL equals to 1 if
a rm issues a private placement (either by xed price or by auction) and 0 otherwise. AUC equals to 1 if
a rm issues a private placement with the auction method and 0 if a rm issues a private placement with
a xed price method. log(value) is log of market value of the rm. Q is the market to book ratio of the
rm. cash is the cash and cash equivalent over total assets. firmage is the age of the rm. lev is the total
debt over total assets. profitability is the earning before interest over total asset. investment is the capital
expenditure over total asset. We report the t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signicance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent variable:
PPL AUC
(1) (2)
Q 0.070  0.071
(2.677) ( 4.784)
cash 0.372 0.468
(2.901) (2.738)
Firmage 0.007  0.010
(2.259) ( 2.272)
leverage  0.054  1.002
( 0.537) ( 6.909)
profitability 2.202 0.284
(6.620) (0.533)
investment 1.509 2.233
(5.526) (6.357)
log(value) 0.234 0.242
(14.349) (9.478)
year dummies Yes Yes
industry dummies Yes Yes
Observations 14,498 2,815
Pseudo R2 0.066 0.090
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Table 9 Heckman two stage for sample selection: stage 2
This table reports the second stage results of the Heckman two stage regressions. The one year performance
is proxied by four variables. raw is the one year holding period return of the stock. matched is raw minus
the matched rm's return of the same period.market is raw minus the market index return of the same
period. capm is the abnormal return adjusted by CAPM model.WAD is the quantity weighted absolute
distance, scaled by the weighted average of bidding price. SD is the quantity weighted standard deviation
of all bidding price for one private placement deal, scaled by the weighted average of the bidding price.
percentage is the number of the issuing shares in the private placement over the total shares outstanding of
the rm. log(value) is log of market value of the rm. Q is the market to book ratio of the rm. cash is
the cash and cash equivalent over total assets. ROA is return on assets. firmage is the age of the rm. lev
is the total debt over total assets. discount is the discount rate of the issuing price compared to the market
price. em is a proxy for earning management, which is calculated from adjusted Jones Model. dispersion
is the standard deviation of analyst earning forecasts, scaled by the book value per share. IMR1 is the
inverse millers ratio from stage one probit regression in the rst setting (Panel A of Table 8). We report the
t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
raw matched market capm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
WAD  0.621  0.458  0.423  0.331
( 3.056) ( 2.183) ( 2.377) ( 2.099)
SD  0.517  0.376  0.345  0.269
( 3.116) ( 2.193) ( 2.375) ( 2.085)
percentage 3.476 3.511 2.882 2.918 1.511 1.547 1.422 1.453
(1.330) (1.345) (1.068) (1.082) (0.661) (0.677) (0.701) (0.716)
log(value)  0.114  0.114  0.109  0.109  0.098  0.098  0.107  0.107
( 2.444) ( 2.446) ( 2.252) ( 2.254) ( 2.386) ( 2.388) ( 2.950) ( 2.952)
Q 0.085 0.085 0.099 0.099 0.080 0.080 0.075 0.075
(4.448) (4.483) (5.024) (5.040) (4.786) (4.801) (5.043) (5.052)
discount  0.008  0.008  0.007  0.007  0.006  0.006  0.005  0.005
( 5.394) ( 5.372) ( 4.826) ( 4.811) ( 4.926) ( 4.910) ( 3.925) ( 3.912)
cahs  0.180  0.186  0.078  0.082 0.054 0.050 0.108 0.105
( 0.845) ( 0.873) ( 0.354) ( 0.374) (0.288) (0.267) (0.652) (0.633)
ROA 1.374 1.389 0.587 0.595 0.806 0.814 0.632 0.637
(1.965) (1.986) (0.812) (0.824) (1.318) (1.330) (1.163) (1.172)
Firmage 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007
(2.676) (2.671) (2.768) (2.764) (1.825) (1.822) (1.877) (1.874)
lev 0.293 0.295 0.284 0.285 0.428 0.429 0.340 0.341
(1.481) (1.493) (1.390) (1.396) (2.473) (2.478) (2.214) (2.217)
em  0.042  0.042 0.060 0.060  0.073  0.072  0.021  0.020
( 0.325) ( 0.321) (0.445) (0.449) ( 0.638) ( 0.633) ( 0.203) ( 0.199)
IMR1  0.142  0.141  0.084  0.083  0.137  0.136  0.064  0.063
( 0.895) ( 0.891) ( 0.510) ( 0.505) ( 0.983) ( 0.976) ( 0.517) ( 0.510)
Constant 1.056 1.052 0.920 0.916 1.267 1.264 1.440 1.437
(1.072) (1.068) (0.905) (0.901) (1.471) (1.466) (1.882) (1.878)
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 411
R2 0.418 0.419 0.323 0.323 0.226 0.226 0.211 0.211
Adjusted R2 0.366 0.366 0.261 0.261 0.156 0.156 0.139 0.139
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Table 10 Heckman two stage 2 (sub-sample with private placements)
This table reports the second stage results of the Heckman two stage regressions. The one year performance
is proxied by four variables. raw is the one year holding period return of the stock. matched is raw minus
the matched rm's return of the same period.market is raw minus the market index return of the same
period. capm is the abnormal return adjusted by CAPM model.WAD is the quantity weighted absolute
distance, scaled by the weighted average of bidding price. SD is the quantity weighted standard deviation
of all bidding price for one private placement deal, scaled by the weighted average of the bidding price.
percentage is the number of the issuing shares in the private placement over the total shares outstanding of
the rm. log(value) is log of market value of the rm. Q is the market to book ratio of the rm. cash is
the cash and cash equivalent over total assets. ROA is return on assets. firmage is the age of the rm. lev
is the total debt over total assets. discount is the discount rate of the issuing price compared to the market
price. em is a proxy for earning management, which is calculated from adjusted Jones Model. dispersion
is the standard deviation of analyst earning forecasts, scaled by the book value per share. IMR2 is the
inverse millers ratio from stage one probit regression in the second setting (Panel B of Table 8). We report
the t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
raw matched market capm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
WAD  0.623  0.459  0.424  0.333
( 3.063) ( 2.187) ( 2.385) ( 2.106)
SD  0.519  0.377  0.346  0.270
( 3.124) ( 2.198) ( 2.383) ( 2.092)
percentage 3.449 3.483 2.860 2.895 1.486 1.521 1.381 1.411
(1.319) (1.334) (1.059) (1.073) (0.650) (0.666) (0.680) (0.696)
log(value)  0.122  0.122  0.114  0.114  0.105  0.105  0.112  0.112
( 2.349) ( 2.352) ( 2.116) ( 2.118) ( 2.310) ( 2.312) ( 2.776) ( 2.778)
Q 0.085 0.085 0.099 0.099 0.080 0.080 0.075 0.075
(4.456) (4.491) (5.037) (5.052) (4.795) (4.810) (5.065) (5.074)
discount  0.008  0.008  0.007  0.007  0.006  0.006  0.005  0.005
( 5.396) ( 5.373) ( 4.827) ( 4.812) ( 4.928) ( 4.912) ( 3.924) ( 3.911)
cash  0.203  0.209  0.092  0.096 0.031 0.027 0.097 0.094
( 0.958) ( 0.986) ( 0.419) ( 0.438) (0.167) (0.147) (0.588) (0.570)
ROA 1.423 1.438 0.618 0.627 0.852 0.860 0.666 0.671
(1.988) (2.009) (0.836) (0.847) (1.361) (1.373) (1.198) (1.206)
Firmage 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.007
(2.770) (2.764) (2.777) (2.773) (1.969) (1.964) (1.933) (1.930)
lev 0.354 0.356 0.321 0.322 0.486 0.487 0.374 0.374
(1.516) (1.526) (1.332) (1.336) (2.380) (2.383) (2.061) (2.063)
em  0.042  0.042 0.060 0.060  0.073  0.072  0.021  0.020
( 0.326) ( 0.322) (0.444) (0.448) ( 0.638) ( 0.634) ( 0.204) ( 0.199)
IMR2 3.569 3.591 3.068 3.082 2.662 2.675 0.273 0.281
(2.655) (2.673) (2.206) (2.216) (2.257) (2.268) (0.260) (0.267)
Constant  13.192  13.258  10.544  10.584  7.691  7.723 2.842 2.822
( 2.151) ( 2.162) ( 1.661) ( 1.667) ( 1.421) ( 1.426) (0.591) (0.586)
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 411
R2 0.418 0.419 0.323 0.323 0.226 0.226 0.211 0.211
Adjusted R2 0.366 0.366 0.261 0.261 0.156 0.156 0.139 0.139
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Table 11 Robustness check 1: long-run performance starting from one month later
This table reports the results of regressions of one year performance, starting from one month after the
announcement, on bids dispersion of private placements.The one year performance is proxied by four vari-
ables. raw is the one year holding period return of the stock. matched is raw minus the matched rm's
return of the same period.market is raw minus the market index return of the same period. capm is the
abnormal return adjusted by CAPM model.WAD is the quantity weighted absolute distance, scaled by the
weighted average of bidding price. SD is the quantity weighted standard deviation of all bidding price for
one private placement deal, scaled by the weighted average of the bidding price. percentage is the number
of the issuing shares in the private placement over the total shares outstanding of the rm. log(value) is log
of market value of the rm. Q is the market to book ratio of the rm. cash is the cash and cash equivalent
over total assets. ROA is return on assets. firmage is the age of the rm. lev is the total debt over total
assets. discount is the discount rate of the issuing price compared to the market price. em is a proxy for
earning management, which is calculated from adjusted Jones Model. dispersion is the standard deviation
of analyst earning forecasts, scaled by the book value per share. We report the t-statistics in parentheses.
***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
raw matched market capm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
WAD  0.616  0.382  0.430  0.323
( 3.118) ( 1.651) ( 2.454) ( 2.014)
SD  0.521  0.354  0.357  0.266
( 3.228) ( 1.874) ( 2.489) ( 2.032)
percentage 2.985 3.005 2.892 2.859 1.684 1.709 1.068 1.089
(1.219) (1.229) (1.007) (0.998) (0.774) (0.786) (0.538) (0.548)
log(value)  0.079  0.079  0.076  0.075  0.060  0.060  0.086  0.086
( 2.331) ( 2.336) ( 1.918) ( 1.909) ( 2.004) ( 2.011) ( 3.156) ( 3.163)
Q 0.068 0.069 0.058 0.059 0.063 0.064 0.062 0.062
(3.751) (3.798) (2.723) (2.775) (3.942) (3.968) (4.231) (4.248)
discount  0.006  0.006  0.003  0.003  0.005  0.005  0.003  0.003
( 4.338) ( 4.312) ( 1.950) ( 1.920) ( 3.605) ( 3.587) ( 2.554) ( 2.540)
cash  0.191  0.197  0.091  0.095 0.047 0.043 0.104 0.101
( 0.927) ( 0.956) ( 0.376) ( 0.395) (0.257) (0.235) (0.619) (0.602)
ROA 0.958 0.977 1.091 1.113 0.407 0.418 0.458 0.466
(1.509) (1.538) (1.466) (1.496) (0.722) (0.740) (0.890) (0.904)
Firmage 0.012 0.012 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
(2.602) (2.596) (0.351) (0.341) (1.476) (1.472) (1.610) (1.607)
lev 0.181 0.184 0.378 0.382 0.345 0.347 0.284 0.285
(1.066) (1.086) (1.902) (1.923) (2.291) (2.303) (2.066) (2.075)
em  0.002  0.002  0.133  0.134  0.068  0.067  0.017  0.016
( 0.019) ( 0.017) ( 0.898) ( 0.904) ( 0.601) ( 0.598) ( 0.162) ( 0.159)
Constant 0.287 0.286 0.253 0.247 0.499 0.500 1.139 1.139
(0.538) (0.536) (0.404) (0.395) (1.052) (1.053) (2.628) (2.629)
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 411
R2 0.410 0.411 0.156 0.158 0.179 0.179 0.172 0.172
Adjusted R2 0.358 0.359 0.082 0.084 0.107 0.107 0.099 0.099
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Table 12 Robustness check 2: two-years long-run performance
This table reports the results of regressions of two years long-run performance on bids dispersion of private
placements. The two year performance is proxied by four variables. raw is the one year holding period return
of the stock. matched is raw minus the matched rm's return of the same period.market is raw minus the
market index return of the same period. capm is the abnormal return adjusted by CAPM model.WAD is
the quantity weighted absolute distance, scaled by the weighted average of bidding price. SD is the quantity
weighted standard deviation of all bidding price for one private placement deal, scaled by the weighted
average of the bidding price. percentage is the number of the issuing shares in the private placement over
the total shares outstanding of the rm. log(value) is log of market value of the rm. Q is the market to
book ratio of the rm. cash is the cash and cash equivalent over total assets. ROA is return on assets.
firmage is the age of the rm. lev is the total debt over total assets. discount is the discount rate of the
issuing price compared to the market price. em is a proxy for earning management, which is calculated from
adjusted Jones Model. dispersion is the standard deviation of analyst earning forecasts, scaled by the book
value per share. We report the t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level, respectively.
raw matched market capm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
WAD  0.597  0.382  0.423  0.296
( 2.826) ( 1.697) ( 2.200) ( 2.041)
SD  0.497  0.398  0.348  0.239
( 2.882) ( 1.924) ( 2.215) ( 2.017)
percentage 4.304 4.334 2.155 2.117 2.900 2.928 0.532 0.558
(1.644) (1.657) (0.415) (0.408) (1.216) (1.228) (0.295) (0.310)
log(value)  0.093  0.093  0.150  0.150  0.085  0.085  0.102  0.102
( 2.574) ( 2.582) ( 2.102) ( 2.096) ( 2.583) ( 2.591) ( 4.103) ( 4.113)
Q 0.077 0.077 0.043 0.043 0.077 0.078 0.063 0.063
(3.969) (4.003) (1.114) (1.129) (4.402) (4.421) (4.731) (4.740)
discount  0.009  0.009  0.007  0.007  0.007  0.007  0.004  0.004
( 5.548) ( 5.527) ( 2.265) ( 2.254) ( 4.754) ( 4.738) ( 3.581) ( 3.569)
cash  0.101  0.106  0.677  0.679 0.036 0.032 0.157 0.155
( 0.458) ( 0.483) ( 1.550) ( 1.553) (0.180) (0.160) (1.039) (1.022)
ROA 1.056 1.072  0.743  0.732 0.256 0.266 0.299 0.304
(1.555) (1.578) ( 0.552) ( 0.543) (0.415) (0.430) (0.640) (0.651)
Firmage 0.008 0.008  0.004  0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(1.614) (1.609) ( 0.441) ( 0.444) (0.489) (0.485) (0.702) (0.701)
lev 0.186 0.189 0.169 0.171 0.392 0.394 0.317 0.317
(1.028) (1.043) (0.471) (0.477) (2.374) (2.384) (2.541) (2.547)
em 0.015 0.015 0.217 0.216  0.023  0.022 0.056 0.057
(0.110) (0.114) (0.807) (0.804) ( 0.184) ( 0.180) (0.603) (0.607)
Constant 0.134 0.135 0.186 0.187 0.426 0.427 1.104 1.107
(0.235) (0.236) (0.303) (0.305) (0.838) (0.841) (2.646) (2.650)
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355
R2 0.424 0.425 0.294 0.294 0.207 0.206 0.203 0.203
Adjusted R2 0.375 0.376 0.234 0.234 0.139 0.139 0.136 0.135
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Table 13 Robustness check 3: Exclude few bidders sample
This table reports the results of regressions of one years long-run performance on bids dispersion of private
placements. Auctions with bidders less than 5 are excluded.The one year performance is proxied by four
variables. raw is the one year holding period return of the stock. matched is raw minus the matched rm's
return of the same period.market is raw minus the market index return of the same period. capm is the
abnormal return adjusted by CAPM model.WAD is the quantity weighted absolute distance, scaled by the
weighted average of bidding price. SD is the quantity weighted standard deviation of all bidding price for
one private placement deal, scaled by the weighted average of the bidding price. percentage is the number
of the issuing shares in the private placement over the total shares outstanding of the rm. log(value) is log
of market value of the rm. Q is the market to book ratio of the rm. cash is the cash and cash equivalent
over total assets. ROA is return on assets. firmage is the age of the rm. lev is the total debt over total
assets. discount is the discount rate of the issuing price compared to the market price. em is a proxy for
earning management, which is calculated from adjusted Jones Model. dispersion is the standard deviation
of analyst earning forecasts, scaled by the book value per share. We report the t-statistics in parentheses.
***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent variable:
raw matched market capm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
WAD  0.626  0.488  0.429  0.333
( 3.056) ( 2.303) ( 2.385) ( 2.071)
SD  0.520  0.400  0.350  0.269
( 3.113) ( 2.308) ( 2.382) ( 2.053)
percentage 3.511 3.554 2.788 2.831 1.195 1.235 1.156 1.190
(1.356) (1.375) (1.040) (1.057) (0.526) (0.544) (0.569) (0.586)
log(value)  0.077  0.077  0.089  0.089  0.062  0.063  0.089  0.089
( 2.162) ( 2.167) ( 2.432) ( 2.437) ( 2.007) ( 2.013) ( 3.194) ( 3.200)
Q 0.081 0.082 0.100 0.100 0.078 0.079 0.074 0.074
(4.261) (4.300) (5.040) (5.059) (4.656) (4.674) (4.940) (4.951)
discount  0.008  0.008  0.008  0.008  0.007  0.007  0.005  0.005
( 5.316) ( 5.285) ( 4.792) ( 4.769) ( 4.997) ( 4.974) ( 3.901) ( 3.882)
cash  0.154  0.160  0.060  0.065 0.095 0.091 0.149 0.146
( 0.712) ( 0.743) ( 0.270) ( 0.292) (0.500) (0.477) (0.880) (0.860)
ROA 1.290 1.308 0.354 0.366 0.523 0.534 0.496 0.503
(1.806) (1.832) (0.478) (0.495) (0.835) (0.852) (0.885) (0.898)
Firmage 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
(2.492) (2.476) (2.606) (2.594) (1.655) (1.644) (1.787) (1.778)
lev 0.282 0.284 0.248 0.250 0.391 0.392 0.339 0.340
(1.556) (1.571) (1.324) (1.332) (2.459) (2.466) (2.386) (2.391)
em  0.037  0.036 0.074 0.075  0.059  0.059  0.018  0.018
( 0.259) ( 0.254) (0.502) (0.507) ( 0.474) ( 0.468) ( 0.162) ( 0.157)
Constant 0.134 0.132 0.431 0.430 0.414 0.413 0.997 0.997
(0.241) (0.237) (0.745) (0.743) (0.843) (0.842) (2.273) (2.272)
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387
R2 0.412 0.412 0.330 0.330 0.228 0.228 0.210 0.210
Adjusted R2 0.357 0.357 0.268 0.268 0.156 0.156 0.136 0.136
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